An article in The New Republic about the radicalism of democratic liberalism and wartime: The New Republic Online: Resolved
Paul Berman notes that the United States was predicted to fail by Tocqueville because he couldn’t see how a liberal democracy could hold together a diverse nation, mainly because such a society couldn’t possibly wield power.
Tocqueville’s predictions basically came true with the American Civil War, and the nation could have easily splintered; secession was the easier option. What Tocqueville failed to predict was that Lincoln, would consider the United States world historically, and in the Gettysburg Address would respond to Tocqueville’s worries. Basically, he set the country on a new, far more radical project, and called on Americans to preserve the country in an act of will, necessarily wield power. This project is twofold: the liberation of the oppressed and the universal spread of liberal democracy. “That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the Earth.”
This brings us to present times. Berman argues that the Europeans have adopted a “Tocquevillian” attitude to liberalism and democracy: how does such a society wield power? After the wars of the 20th Century, the use of force between EU nations has become unimaginable — not in the sense of being too horrible to contemplate, but in the sense that one cannot imagine it being a component of foreign policy — and this is not a terrible thing. But it is not entirely a good thing, because they cannot imagine how a use of force may promote liberal ideals. And because the United States wields power, by corrollary, they believe it must be nasty, brutish place.
America is Lincolnian in the sense that many people naturally assume that every country will eventually embrace liberal democracy. It happened in 1989 in Eastern Europe, and eventually it will happen in the Middle East. American, in this view, should do what it can to promote these ideals. And this should be the implicit goal of the present war:
The United States has come under military attack, requiring military responses. But, as in the Civil War, the revolutionary responses of liberal democratic ideals are likewise required, and not in a small degree. For the ultimate goal of our present war–the only possible goal–must be to persuade tens of millions of people around the world to give up their paranoid and apocalyptic doctrines about American conspiracies and crimes, to give up those ideas in favor of a lucid and tolerant willingness to accept the modern world with its complexities and advantages. The only war aim that will actually bring us safety is, in short, the spread of liberal outlooks to places that refuse any such views today. That is not a small goal, nor a goal to be achieved in two weeks, nor something to be won through mere military feats, though military feats cannot be avoided.
Berman then goes on the criticize the Bush Administration for failing to articulate that this war is a war against fascism. It may be a lack of vision, a lack of radicalism, and it may prove costly, since most of this war is political — inspiring other people to liberalism instead of medieval fanaticism — and not military.
This ties in with, say, Friedman’s op-ed articulating the liberal argument for war, and expands it. It also relates to Berman’s earlier observation that this is a war against a new fascism.
